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“It was a crazy city, and nobody was running it. Or everybody was, whichever you pick.” 
-Louis Schimmel, Emergency Financial Manager for the City of Hamtramck (2001)1 
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BRINGING INTERNATIONAL POLICY HOME: MICHIGAN’S EMERGENCY  
 
MANAGEMENT AS SUBNATIONAL INDEFINITE TEMPORARY  
 
OCCUPATION 
CHARLES HENRY SHATTUCK V 
ABSTRACT 
 Since 1986, the State of Michigan has developed a policy of financial 
receivership for fiscally distressed local governments.  This system entailed local 
democratic suspension, as the State government installed an Emergency Manager 
with complete power over the locality.  Occupation primarily affected majority-
black cities, was imposed without any real recourse, and lasted as long as State 
officials desired.  A framework of indefinite temporary occupation in international 
politics highlights the structural ways in which Michigan’s subnational policy is 
juridically enabled, a symptom of structural financial and racial disinvestment, for 
the benefits of privileged elites, and contingent on national apathy.  Additionally, the 
application of this lens delineates the systemic ways in which Emergency 
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 With images of mud-brown water gushing from taps and terrible rashes on the 
bodies of young children, the city of Flint, Michigan burst into national discourse in 
2014.  While the majority of the nation’s attention focused on the horrors and outrages of 
this government-inflicted water crisis, some reporters brought the underlying causes to 
light.  Since the end of the second World War, government policies and economic 
changes have led to disinvestment and decay within many of America’s cities.  These 
trends, coupled with historically resilient structural racism, have set cities up to fail and 
many were pushed over the brink following the global financial crisis of 2007-08. 
 On top of these stressors, local governments in Michigan faced an additional 
threat: Emergency Management.  Although many States have legislation providing for 
the intervention of the State government into local affairs during a case of financial 
instability, Michigan is an outlier for the amount of power it seizes from its localities and 
the concentration of control in the hands of a single individual: the Emergency Manager 
(EM).  An EM was the sole decision-maker behind the dubious switch of Flint’s water 
supply, the failure to protect local residents, and the obstruction of popular demands for a 
solution to Flint’s mass-poisoning.  While Flint is the most egregious case of harm 
committed by an EM, such Managers do far more harm than good in the majority of 
cases.  Additionally, the policy is symptomatic of structural racism: over half of 
Michigan’s black constituents were ruled by an EM from 2008 to 2013 and only 2.4% of 
its white population.2  Even when an EM leaves and self-rule is nominally returned to a 
 




local government, Managers leave behind destabilized institutions, substantial long-term 
debt, and measures actively restricting a locality’s autonomy. 
 Other authors primarily evaluate the program of Emergency Management through 
the lens of public administration, based on its immediate results, or discriminatory policy, 
as a symptom of America and Michigan’s long history of systemic racism.  However, 
these writers fail to hone in on how the imposition of an EM, in and of itself, impacts a 
city and its citizen’s ability to govern itself both during and after Management.  Previous 
literature has fallen short of fully framing how State control continues after an EM 
withdraws, and the very real possibility of Emergency Management returning in the 
future.  Drawing from the International Relations assessment of indefinite temporary 
occupation, I position Emergency Management as a subnational form of uncertain, but 
durable, democratic suspension.  Such robust democratic suspension necessarily impairs 
the health of a future return to democracy.  This approach is informed by Robert 
Mickey’s work in Paths out of Dixie evaluating the Jim Crow South as a form of 
subnational authoritarianism.  Mickey’s framework highlights the utility of theories in 
international relations and the comparative analysis of countries for informing our 
understanding of regional governments’ behavior.  Applying the lens of subnational 
indefinite temporary occupation to Emergency Management will advance an 
understanding of Michigan’s policy as not only historically contingent, but also boasting 







THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN’S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
LEGISLATION 
The Legislative Record 
Since the city of Ecorse was put under court-ordered financial receivership in 
December 1986, led by one Louis Schimmel, the State of Michigan has developed a 
lineage of programs which place financially troubled local jurisdictions under its 
authority.3  Two years later, the State legislature passed Public Act 101 of 1988 to further 
support the court’s decision.4  Two years after that, the State legislature passed PA 72 of 
1990, allowing the State to appoint an Emergency Financial Manager (EFM) for any 
local jurisdiction when requested by residents, local officials, or State legislators.  Ten 
years later, this general EFM law was first used in the city of Hamtramck in 2000.  A 
handful of further cities were placed under a PA 72-designated EFM through 2011.   
Following the inauguration of Republican Governor Rick Snyder on January 1, 
2011, the State of Michigan passed a new iteration of receivership with PA 4 of 2011.5  
As a part of Governor Snyder’s technocratic campaign platform, this law replaced the 
position of EFM with that of an Emergency Manager (EM), continuing the previous 
positions while giving managers greater powers.6  The expanded powers of PA 4 of 2011 
caused public uproar, and it was repealed in November 2012 by popular referendum.  In 
response, Rick Snyder and the Republican-controlled State legislature passed PA 436 of 
 
3  LaFaive, “Privatization Brought Ecorse, Michigan, Back from Bankruptcy,” 1999. 
4  Ivacko and Horner, “Local Leaders,” 2. 
5 Jones, “Tenants at Will of the Legislature,” 131-143. 




2012, which was similar to the repealed law, but immune to repeal by popular vote.  One 
major concession of this new law is that local governments in fiscal distress have more 
choices (subject to State Treasury Department approval).  Local jurisdictions may: go 
through bankruptcy proceedings, enter mediation with creditors, form a consent 
agreement with the State, or have an EM appointed.  PA 436 of 2012 gained national 
attention due to the role of EMs in both Detroit’s bankruptcy proceedings during 2013-
2014 and in causing Flint’s ongoing water crisis.7  Despite the election of Democratic 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer in January 2019, Republican control of the state legislature 
ensures that this version of Emergency Management law is still on Michigan’s books as 
of October 2020.8 
 
Louis Schimmel, the Architect of Emergency Management 
 Behind the scenes, Louis Schimmel has been a recurring actor in the development 
of Michigan’s management laws since his appointment as the city of Ecorse’s receiver in 
1986.  Since Judge James Rashid officially ended Ecorse’s receivership on August 31, 
1990, Schimmel has played key roles in the implementation and construction of later 
management policy.9  First, Schimmel remained as an official “monitor” of the city of 
Ecorse until August 1st, 1999.  His oversight of the city lasted nine years after his 
official, and oft-cited, departure date.10  During this time, Schimmel served as Executive 
 
7  Ivacko and Horner, “Local Leaders,” 2. 
8  According to an online search of Michigan Compiled Laws on 11/8/2020 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(0cno0srremfcrr3fhtxn0ehn))/mileg.aspx?page=MclPASearch 
9 Hohman, “The 1987 City of Ecorse Receivership,” 2012.  




Director for the Municipal Advisory Council of Michigan, retiring in February 2001.  
The Municipal Advisory Council of Michigan is “a statistical clearing house for 
investment bankers located throughout the United States who underwrite and/or invest in 
Michigan municipal bond issues.”11  Interestingly enough, seven websites maintain 
verbatim that “he is recognized in the municipal bond industry as an authority on the 
creditworthiness of Michigan municipal debt issues.”12  Schimmel has been generally 
active in municipal bondholding firms and public-adjacent organizations, such as the 
Michigan-focused neoliberal think tank Mackinac Center for Public Policy.13  The 
Mackinac Center is funded by a range of conservative billionaires and pushes a 
technocratic ideology which privileges the policy preferences of “experts” over those of 
citizens and democratically elected officials.14 
After his extensive tenure of control and influence over Ecorse during the late 80s 
and 90s, Schimmel has been repeatedly involved in Michigan’s history of Emergency 
Management.  He was selected as EFM of Hamtramck in 2000 and served until 2007, one 
of the first two EFMs ever appointed under PA 72 of 1990.15  In 2005, Schimmel 
published a guiding report through the Mackinac Center titled “Can Detroit’s Problems 
Be Solved by an Emergency Manager?”16  In 2011, the Mackinac Center republished this 
 
11 “About Our Members,” The Michigan Legislative Council. Accessed February 8, 2021.  
12 ibid.; “Contributor Louis Schimmel,” Verizon Media, Accessed February 9, 2021; Gilroy and LaFaive, 
“From Traditional to Contract City,” 2014; “Louis H. Schimmel Jr.,” Mackinac Center for Public Policy,” 
Accessed February 9, 2021; Municipal Financial Consultants Incorporated, “Former Pontiac Emergency 
Manager Louis H. Schimmel,” August 18, 2014; Russell, “Finally a Qualified Emergency Manager,” Vol. 
2 Issue 11: 2. 
13 “Louis H. Schimmel Jr.,” Mackinac Center for Public Policy,” Accessed February 9, 2021. 
14 Stanley, “The Emergency Manager,” 4-5 and 21-23. 
15 Clark and Gorina, “Emergency Financial Management in Small Michigan Cities,” 542. 




article by Schimmel two months before Snyder’s PA 4 of 2011 was introduced.  This 
proximity supports the conclusion that Schimmel provided an effective outline for the 
policy which followed.17  After Hamtramck, Schimmel was again one of the first EMs 
appointed under PA 4 of 2011 and ruled over the City of Pontiac.  He ran the city from 
September 12, 2011 through August 19, 2013.18  Following Pontiac’s exit from 
management, Schimmel was appointed by Governor Snyder to the city’s Receivership 
Transition Advisory Board (RTAB), overseeing the city through July 27th of 2017.19 
 Louis Schimmel’s prevalence throughout the entire duration of Michigan’s 
Emergency Management laws, with brief interludes in municipal bondholding 
organizations and think tanks, illustrates a level of coherence and continuity in the State’s 
policy attitude towards local governments.  While Management manifested in a variety of 
juridical forms, the underlying technocratic and neoliberal impulse remained constant.  
Schimmel’s pervasiveness helps illustrate this fact.  Although the entirety of the program 
cannot be credited to him, Schimmel’s involvement from the first receivership, through 
the drafting of PA 4 of 2011, and onwards demonstrates an underlying unity to 
Michigan’s phenomenon of EMs.  Thus, it is vital to theoretically conceptualize and 
contextualize Emergency Management policy. 
 
 
17 Seamster, “When Democracy Disappears,” 319. 
18 Municipal Financial Consultants Incorporated, “Former Pontiac Emergency Manager Louis H. 
Schimmel,” August 18, 2014. 




Single-Issue and Systemic-Issues Cities 
 Between 2000 and 2014, the State of Michigan placed nine different local 
governments under Emergency Management: Highland Park, Benton Harbor, 
Hamtramck, Flint, Detroit, Pontiac, Ecorse, Lincoln Park, Three Oaks, and Allen Park.  
One important distinction must be made amongst these cities.  While the first eight cities 
suffered from the “systemic issues” facing post-industrial cities throughout America, 
Three Oaks and Allen Park were placed under Management for “single issue” reasons.20  
The Village of Three Oaks became financially distressed after the poor fiscal 
management of a street project by the local council.21  Allen Park suffered from financial 
mismanagement, but was pushed over the edge by fraudulent bond deals written by a 
former mayor and city administrator for a failing city-owned movie studio.22  In addition 
to differing causes of financial instability, these two single-issue cities are 
demographically different from the other eight.  Three Oaks and Allen Park have 
household incomes almost twice that of the others, have far lower levels of poverty, and 
are over ninety percent white.23  Furthermore, predominantly white single-issue cities 
have been more receptive towards management and suffered fewer unilateral decisions 
by EMs (although Allen Park has suffered lasting reductions in its democratic health).  
Due to these fundamental distinctions between single-issue and systemic-issues cities, 
 
20 Jones, “Tenants at Will of the Legislature,” 318-321. 
21 Jones, “Three Oaks Goes Broke.” 
22 Meloni, “Judge Slams State of Michigan in Failed Allen Park Movie Studio.” 





this in-depth analysis of democratic suspension under Emergency Management will 





SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 In recent years, works by scholars and academic writers have proliferated, seeking 
to evaluate EM policy, its effects, and its relevance to different theoretical frameworks.  
So far, this analysis has fallen into two camps: those who gauge Michigan’s Emergency 
Management in terms of general public administration, and those who judge the program 
as simply another iteration of racist government policy.  While mainly concluding that 
Emergency Management has negative outcomes for those ruled by it, both of these 
approaches use lenses from current and historic American policy to frame Michigan’s 
EM policy.  Through the application of external theory, I will elucidate the ongoing and 
future implications of Emergency Management. 
Within international relations, indefinite temporary occupation is a state of 
occupation by a foreign power that is considered “temporary occupation” under the 
constraints of international law, but has nonetheless lasted for an “indefinite” period of 
time.  The most infamous example of this phenomenon is the Israeli occupation of the 
Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem since 1967.24  I recognize the place of 
EMs within the history of discriminatory and oppressive policy in Michigan and 
America.  However, through the framework of indefinite temporary occupation, I 
position Emergency Management as a distinct state of governance which mirrors 
international conceptions of indefinite temporary occupation.  Through this perspective, I 
will assess Emergency Management as a form of occupation by the superior State 
 





government, limited by the legal framework of the U.S. Constitution and federal law but 
nonetheless tenacious.  This lens will advance an understanding of Michigan’s 
Emergency Management policy as not only historically contingent, but also boasting its 
own enduring legacy within affected cities. 
 
Public Administration 
 As State-appointed bureaucrats, Michigan’s EFMs and EMs have received 
attention from scholars of public administration.  Researchers in this field have sought to 
appraise Emergency Management according to its purported goal: rescuing local 
jurisdictions from financial ruin.  Their works seek to answer such questions as: who 
makes a good EM?25 do local officials approve of EM laws?26 does Emergency 
Management actually improve fiscal health?27 and do citizens benefit from EMs?28  
While this line of research has produced important information on the efficacy and 
impact of Emergency Management programs in Michigan, its analysis is limited by 
appraising EMs as an expression of current public policy.  This perspective fails to 
adequately incorporate historical contexts of race and oppression which shape Michigan’s 
EM policy.  Also, while these works do integrate forward-looking estimations of EMs’ 
long-term effects, writers generally limit their assessments to service or finance-related 
factors without concern for long-term changes in governance or institutional capacity.   
 
25 Kasdan, “A Tale of Two Hatchet Men.” 
26 Ivacko and Horner, “Local Leaders.” 
27 Clark and Gorina, “Emergency Financial Management.”  






 Outside of the bureaucratic lens of public administration, researchers have 
positioned Emergency Management in Michigan as a continuation of the American 
North’s particular history of discriminatory policies: redlining, white-flight, urban 
disinvestment, and voter suppression.29  These scholars have used frameworks such as 
technocracy,30 Vesla Weaver’s “frontlash,”31 strategic racism,32 structural racism,33 
neoliberalism,34 and a “white urban regime.”35  Such perspectives describe: the structures 
essential to Emergency Management in Michigan (strategic and structural racism), the 
narratives justifying the policy (technocracy and neoliberalism), and the methods used by 
primarily white elites to shape implementation (frontlash and the white urban regime).  
These theoretical lenses describe the context of Emergency Management but fail to 
describe EM policy itself.   
Researchers have identified the structures, long-term trends, narratives, and actors 
behind Michigan’s EM implementation, but they have failed to directly address 
Management itself.  Important questions remain.  What legislative and juridical traditions 
shape EM law?  In what ways do national American political objectives constrain or 
 
29 Clark, The Poisoned City. 
30 Stanley, “The Emergency Manager.” 
31 ibid., Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis.” 
32 ibid. 
33 Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis;” Seamster, “When Democracy Disappears.” 
34 Fasenfest and Pride, “Emergency Management in Michigan;” Fasenfest, “A Neoliberal Response to an 
Urban Crisis.” 




enable Michigan’s decisions?  Additionally, these disparate works place EMs within the 
historical trajectory of American racism, but they fail to directly address how the 
implementation of Emergency Management itself leaves lasting institutional damage in 
local jurisdictions.  Papers assessing Flint, Michigan’s case necessarily mention the 
enduring impact of lead poisoning on the mental, physical, and societal health of the 
city.36  However, this analysis still falls short of focusing on the institutional future of 
local governments.  In particular, it is important to understand the ways in which the 
antidemocratic nature of Emergency Management produces a continuing or perpetual 
state of crippled local democracy. 
 
Indefinite Temporary Occupation 
 For the Realist school of International Relations, influenced by the anarchic “state 
of nature” in Hobbes’ Leviathan, interactions between states occur in an environment of 
brute power calculations, interstate lawlessness, and impotent international institutions.37  
However, international law does impose potent boundaries on state behavior.  Such limits 
even extend to the most concrete aspects of a state’s existence.  For instance, the 
remarkable persistence of African states and their post-colonial borders after 
independence relies in no small part upon international institutions and their laws.38  
Within a similar purview, international law is widely considered to prohibit the 
 
36 Clark, The Poisoned City; Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis;” Stanley, “The Emergency Manager.” 
37 Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” 




annexation of territory by a state through Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Article 49 of 
the fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV).39 
 The strength of international laws regarding annexation have constrained states’ 
occupation of foreign territory since the end of the second World War.  An official and 
legal annexation of territory has been rejected by the international community for 
occupations by states such as Israel (of Palestinian territories since 1967), Morocco (of 
Western Sahara since 1975), Turkey (of Northern Cyprus since 1974), and Indonesia (of 
East Timor between 1975-1999).40  Due to the functional international prohibition on 
annexation, rule by these states of their subject territory is regarded as a temporary 
occupation.  Therefore, there is an international consensus that the rules of war regarding 
provisional occupation of foreign territory should apply.  However, as the extant 
occupations are nearing their 50th anniversary, it is important to highlight that the 
original drafters of international laws never envisioned an indefinite form of temporary 
occupation.  While there is some room for eventualities of protracted foreign occupation 
and decades-long suspension of self-rule, there is no specific legal classification for such 
indefinite temporary occupation.  This oversight is due to the avoidance of colonial 
 
39 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  Section III (Articles 
47-78) of the fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) regards Occupied Territories.  Article 49 of GCIV 
states that “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied 
or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive” and that “The Occupying Power shall not deport or 
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”  Explicit commentary on 
these international agreements functioning as a ban on annexation can be found respectively on 
pages 12 and 33 of Arai-Takahashi’s “Unearthing the Problematized Terrain of Prolonged 
Occupation.” 




precedent, such as the British occupation of Egypt from 1882 to 1954, during the 
composition of post-war international articles.41 
 Due to the combined trends of continued occupation and the impossibility of 
formal annexation, indefinite temporary occupation has become a fact of contemporary 
world politics.  This state of governance is defined by a suspension of self-rule, an 
imposition of external control, and the inability of international actors to change the 
status quo.  Global opponents are generally unable to sway a nation to leave foreign soil 
(and in the Israeli case have failed to push the issue militarily) and global supporters of 
the occupation are unable or unwilling to ensure the permanent possession of occupied 
territory.  Beyond the sheer inability to annex territory, rule by occupying states is also 
partially constrained through international law and the expectations of the international 
community.  In order to legitimize its rule of Palestinian territory, Israel partially 
observes the tenants of GCIV.  Additionally, critics of the occupation have proposed 
strengthening the sovereignty of Palestine, through its admission to the UN as a member-
state, as a way to accelerate an end to the status quo and the suspension of democratic 
self-rule.42  While the current Israeli approach to its occupied territories evolves, the 
majority of its indefinite temporary occupation has been characterized by a precise and 
contorted interaction with international laws and the assumption of ultimate state 
authority by Israel for its benefit.43 
 
 
41 Arai-Takahashi, “Unearthing the Problematized Terrain of Prolonged Occupation,” 39-41. 
42 Klug, “A Never-Ending Occupation.” 




THE APPLICATION OF INDEFINITE TEMPORARY OCCUPATION TO 
MICHIGAN’S EM LAWS  
Robert Mickey’s Paths out of Dixie Framework 
 Mickey’s work focuses on presenting Democratic rule of States from the end of 
Reconstruction through 1972 in the American South as a case of “subnational 
authoritarian” enclaves.  While previous researchers developed the concept through 
studies of Latin America and Russia, the application of subnational authoritarianism to 
the United States was a novel concept.44  Enclaves of such undemocratic rule are defined 
by six major characteristics.  First, authoritarian enclaves are a “political achievement” in 
appeasing various elite interests and maintaining governance over time.45  Second, these 
governments are not sovereign, and are necessarily restricted by the policy, laws, 
institutions of the national state. Third, enclave rulers actively participate in national 
politics in order to stifle action by internal and external opponents.  Fourth, national 
parties provide resources and autonomy to enclaves in return for support on the national 
stage.  Fifth, enclaves are protected under national judiciaries that do not interfere in 
internal matters of repression.  Sixth, the decentralization of power and control to 
regional governments increases the resources and capabilities of authoritarian enclaves.46   
As such enclaves maintain a complex relation to their national government, of 
subordination and support, their process of democratization is distinct from that of states 
and occurs in three ways.  First, subnational democratization may be “party-led,” in 
 
44 Johnson, “Paths Out of Dixie.” 
45 Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie, 34. 




which national party allies electorally assist opponents to local regimes.  Second, “center-
led” transitions are imposed on the enclave by the national government.  Third, “self-
imposed'' democratization is primarily motivated by internal forces.  In general, self-
imposed changes are rare given the weakness of local opponents, party-led transition is 
possible only where electoral competition is viable, and center-led democratization is the 
most credible threat to even entrenched enclaves.  Therefore, subnational regimes seek to 
prevent the nationalization of internal conflicts.47 
Through this robust conceptualization of subnational authoritarian enclaves, with 
an eye on American examples, Mickey illustrates regimes which are far more limited and 
contingent than their sovereign counterparts.  While these States do produce effective 
bargains with local elites, they are inherently tied to the norms and structures of the 
overarching national government.  Most importantly, they can only maintain their ruling 
status quo through the tacit consent or distraction of the superior state. 
 
Criteria of Subnational Indefinite Temporary Occupation 
 While the Emergency Management of Michigan’s local governments was not 
durable enough, robust enough, or far-ranging enough to constitute a full case of 
subnational authoritarianism, a merger of this concept with that of indefinite temporary 
occupation lends itself to a characterization and understanding of EMs effect on 
Michigan’s citizens.  Drawing from these two terms, subnational indefinite temporary 
occupation (SITO) can be considered to have six facets.  First, SITO is a policy 
 




achievement constructed around the consensus of powerholding local and regional elites, 
and is thus liable to shift as the situation on the ground evolves.  Second, the norms, laws, 
and institutions of the national government necessarily restricts the policy space of a 
regional government which enacts SITO.  Third, a regional government’s implementation 
of SITO endures through the tacit or implicit consent of the national government and 
national parties.  Fourth, SITO particularly requires a national judiciary with a 
sympathetic or disinterested stance.  Fifth, strong regional governments are more capable 
of implementing and sustaining indefinite temporary occupation.  Sixth, restraints on 
regional governments mean that occupation will likely be imposed on sections of their 
own territory and be less reliant on military or security personnel for day-to-day 
operations. 
 From these foundational characteristics, SITO can be succinctly defined as a 
suspension of a local government’s self-rule by a regional government, which continues 
indefinitely.  This occupation appears to be temporary in order to avoid possible 
interference by a superior national government.  Whatever the region’s initial or 
purported purpose of democratic suspension, it strengthens and becomes indefinite in 
those localities where occupation is most beneficial to regional elites.  The three possible 
routes to ending this form of indefinite temporary occupation are likely to mirror that of 
changes to subnational authoritarianism: party-led, center-led, or self-imposed.  While an 
end to SITO is likely to require less pressure than subnational authoritarianism, due to 











MICHIGAN’S EM LAWS AS SUBNATIONAL INDEFINITE TEMPORARY 
OCCUPATION 
The General Position of Local Governments in the United States 
 While the United States Constitution explicitly addresses the purview of the State 
and federal governments, the subject of local governance is far more ambiguous.  Two 
competing perspectives, first robustly defined in court cases following the Civil War, 
shape the strength and inviolability of local governments.  The dominant perspective is 
“Dillon’s Rule,” crafted by Chief Justice John Forrest Dillon of the Iowa State Supreme 
Court.  With City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad (1868), he 
famously declared that: 
 
“The true view is this: Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their 
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of 
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may 
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation 
on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of 
so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal 
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no 
limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned. They 
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.” (City of Clinton v. 





This perspective was further reinforced through Dillon’s publishing of his Commentaries 
on the Law of Municipal Corporations in 1872, the first compilation of its kind in 
America.  While this work consisted of multiple volumes published in five editions 
through 1911, and reflected on over 40,000 cases, the Commentaries’ most influential 
section was on the expansion of Dillon’s Rule.  Although Dillon conceives of a distant 
limit to the power States hold over local governments, terming the dissolution of a 
locality as “so great a folly” in the original City of Clinton case, he applied his Rule 
without restraint throughout his Commentaries and the remainder of his judicial career.48 
 While Dillon’s Rule has gained greater sway and prominence since its inception, 
Cooley’s Doctrine has correspondingly emphasized a fundamental right to local 
government since 1871.  In People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlburt (1871), Justice Thomas 
McIntyre Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court authored an opinion declaring that 
“The right in the state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local 
government, but to provide for and put it in motion.”  Furthermore: 
 
“The state may mould local institutions according to its views of policy or 
expediency; but local government is matter of absolute right; and the state cannot 
take it away. It would be the boldest mockery to speak of a city as pos-sessing 
municipal liberty where the state not only shaped its government, but at discretion 
sent in its own agents to administer it...” (People Ex Rel. le Roy v. Hurlbut 1871) 
 
 




Although Cooley’s Doctrine was authored within a few years of Dillon’s rule, as 
well as expanded by additional jurists and legal scholars, the Doctrine failed to gain 
similar sway within American politics and jurisprudence.49  Dillon’s Rule succeeded 
because of greater coherence in its argument, the infancy of conceptions of “public 
property,” and the supremacy of State legislatures in contemporary politics.  With these 
favorable conditions, Dillon’s Rule has cemented itself into American political thinking 
at the expense of Cooley’s Doctrine and local self-rule.50  The allocation of such 
complete power to the States is also reflected in the intentions of the Constitution’s 
framers.  In the Federalist No. 51, Madison famously argues that “ambition must be made 
to counteract ambition” and that “in the compound republic of America… a double 
security arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments (State and federal) 
will control each other” and ultimately benefit democratic rule.51  However, as seen with 
the United States experiment in colonial government and extensive decentralization in the 
Philippines, an unyielding promotion of regional governments has a “not infrequent 
capacity to promote local authoritarianism instead.”52 
 
A Brief History of Urban Destabilization and Structural Racism Since 1900 
 Since the turn of the twentieth century, America’s Northern cities have been 
defined by industrialization and segregation, followed by deindustrialization, 
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disinvestment, and racism’s enduring structures.  As manufacturing boomed in the first 
decades of the 1900s, hundreds of thousands of black people migrated to the North, 
particularly Michigan’s industrial region centered around Detroit, Flint, and other 
outlying cities.  These new residents encountered robust institutions of racism and 
segregated housing.  Local housing laws and practices explicitly sought to restrict the 
neighborhoods available to black residents and other minorities.  Company housing 
provided by large manufacturing corporations was additionally “whites-only.”  These 
practices led to overcrowding in minority-dominant areas of the city and prevented the 
accumulation of wealth by non-white residents.  While the New Deal sought to promote 
economic recovery, its economic aid did little to challenge these trends.53 
 After the end of World War II in 1945, urban flight began as improved 
infrastructure began to connect the suburbs, particularly highways, water, and sewer 
services.  As the suburbs grew, residents, manufacturing, and capital left the core of 
industrial cities.54  This movement was further promoted by the federal government.  As 
Cold War defensive policy, Truman’s administration encouraged industrial flight from 
urban concentrations in order to reduce vulnerability to potential Soviet attacks.  With 
manufacturing dispersing, and institutionalized racism restricting economic and social 
freedoms, discontent in cities across the country erupted into protests and riots during the 
late 1960s.  Despite the national upheaval, and the deployment of federal troops on U.S. 
soil, legislation stalled until the unrest which followed Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
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assassination in 1968.  Despite the passage of some legislation at the national, State, and 
local levels, segregation continued as explicit redlining and racial prohibitions morphed 
into less blatant restrictions.  As exclusionary suburbs expanded, some action was taken 
at the federal level, until dismantled by the Nixon administration.55 
 The twin factors of industrialization and segregation, followed by urban flight, 
ensured that cities reliant on manufacturing lost wealth as the twentieth century 
progressed and that black families were robbed of financial stability and capital 
accumulation.56  As of the 1990s, “hypersegregation” along all five major dimensions of 
spatial variation was endemic in America’s major urban cities, including Detroit.57  Even 
after the turn of the twenty first century, property insurance redlining was still prevalent 
despite the removal of blatant discrimination from professional practice.  Non-white 
residents were still restricted from capital accumulation, and urban areas as a whole were 
thus restricted in their development and prosperity.58  With this structural history leaving 
cities hamstrung, Michigan’s State government implemented policy actively crippling 
local governments. 
 In Michigan, the financial health of local governments functionally lies in the 
hands of the State.  Localities’ options for raising revenue are severely restricted by State 
law.  This is especially true for property taxes, the main source of potential income for 
local governments, which are basically limited to the rate of inflation.  Thus, localities 
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rely on revenue sharing, the distribution of funds by the State to local governments, for a 
significant portion of their budgets.  The twin factors of twenty-first century 
deindustrialization and the global financial crisis drastically reduced property values, 
leading to a drop in cities’ revenue.  Local finances have been further stressed by the 
State government, which drastically reduced revenue sharing before the turn of the 
century, due to its own fiscal instability.59  Michigan’s State government reduced revenue 
sharing more than any other between 1998 and 2016, leading to a loss of around $5.5 
billion dollars for localities.  Flint provides a telling example of the impact of decreased 
revenue sharing.  From 2002 to 2014, Flint’s revenue from the State was reduced by a 
total of $55 million.  This much money would have been more than enough to both plug 
holes in the city’s budget and eliminate its debts.60  While the State took substantial funds 
away from Flint, Flint was placed under Emergency Management from 2002 to 2004, and 
again from 2011 through 2015.  When EMs were appointed, State officials blamed Flint’s 
elected government for not fixing structural financial issues with enough urgency.61 
 
Emergency Management as an Indefinite Occupation through the Eyes of Michigan 
Residents 
 The supremacy of Dillon’s Rule in the realm of American politics ensures that 
local governments are juridically viewed as categorically subordinate and inferior to the 
State government.  Within this perspective, any reduction of local rule is justified and 
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proper, though regularly couched in pro-democratic language.  However, it is important 
to note that the residents of localities under EM rule viewed Emergency Management as 
an occupation.   
This perspective has also been echoed by sympathetic figures within the broader 
political realm, judges, legislators, activists, and others who were not directly affected by 
management.  For instance, supporters of Michigan’s EM laws promoted the idea that 
local governments in financial distress had a choice, of which Emergency Management 
was only one of four options.  Under PA 436 of 2012, localities could also choose to 
enter into a consent agreement with the State regarding its budget, bankruptcy, or 
mediation.  However, Eric Scorsone, a researcher on State and local finance at Michigan 
State University, argues that the options presented are a false choice.  Any decision the 
locality makes “has to be agreed by the state and if the state doesn't agree with the choice 
they can veto it, which means that the state can basically force a city” into Emergency 
Management.62  The government of Lincoln Park pursued a consent agreement with the 
State and when the city council rejected the agreement with a 4 to 3 vote the State 
imposed an EM, instead of attempting to renegotiate.63 
Once occupation by a Manager was in place, residents would have every 
expectation that Emergency Management would last indefinitely.  As noted earlier, the 
first case of receivership with the City of Ecorse officially lasted from 1986 to 1990, but 
Louis Schimmel maintained some power for nine more years.  Thus, Ecorse’s self rule 
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was effectively reduced for thirteen straight years even in the first, and least 
institutionalized, case of Management.64  Indeed, the most striking aspect of Emergency 
Management was the provision allowing a city council to remove an EM with a two-
thirds vote after a year and a half.  However, the State ignored its own effective term-
limit by having EMs resign before the eighteen-month mark.  After the appointment of a 
new Manager, “the clock starts over” and a local government has no further options for 
removing an EM.65 
 Residents, local officials, and judges all use the language of occupation when 
describing the law.  Louise Seamster found this trend in interviews with residents and 
city government leaders of Benton Harbor.  Two city commissioners discussed how they 
saw their encounter with Emergency Management echoed in Naomi Klein’s 2007 Shock 
Doctrine, which details “the practice of pushing through austerity programs under cover 
of political/economic crises.”66  Another commissioner drew a haunting comparison 
between State EM occupation and that imposed by the United States during the Iraq 
Reconstruction.  Even more evident in Benton Harbor, Emergency Management was a 
tool of occupation by more local white elites, and the Whirlpool Corporation.67  Constant 
uncertainty driven by crises and “necessary change” leads to “its own kind of stasis” truly 
reminiscent of international examples of indefinite temporary occupation.68 
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 This view of Emergency Management as an occupation and democratic 
usurpation is not limited to the residents of Benton Harbor.  In February of 2013, 
Oakland County Circuit Judge Rae Lee Chabot ruled against Louis Schimmel’s move 
reducing the size of Pontiac’s pension board, remarking that Schimmel’s decision “looks 
like a dictatorship.”69  After saying that he would respect Judge Chabot’s decision,70 
Schimmel again attempted to reduce the size of the pension board.  This led to a 
Wednesday morning ordinance hearing on May 1st, 2013 in which former Mayor Walter 
Moore, a trustee on the board, yelled “You're a carpetbagger!” at Schimmel.  Resident 
Warren Rodgers also remarked that “This is democracy lost” and compared Emergency 
Management to slavery.71 
After the passage of PA 436 of 2012, Ray Holman, a lobbyist with UAW 6000 
Local which represents about 17,000 state employees, remarked that “ultimately, it’s a 
dictator’s law.”72  In early 2013, The American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees along with 21 residents of Detroit, Flint, and Benton Harbor filed a 
lawsuit opposing PA 436 of 2012 for voting rights and Constitutional civil rights 
violations, due to the suspension of local rule for 53% of Michigan’s black residents.  
The lawsuit held that “Public Act 436 establishes a new form of local government … [in 
which] an unelected official … establishes local law by decree.”  A plaintiff from Flint, 
Bishop Bernadel Jefferson, contrasted Emergency Management with democracy, stating 
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that “We shouldn't have an EM at all. This is a free country.”  In response, Governor 
Snyder’s spokesperson, Sara Wurfel, echoed Dillon’s rule, asserting PA 436’s 
constitutionality due to the fact that “local governments are subdivisions of the state.”73 
Emergency Management as occupation, or dictatorial rule, was even acknowledged by 
leading members of Michigan’s Republican regime.  Ken Sikkema, former State Senate 
majority leader for the Republicans, co-chaired Governor Snyder’s 2016 task force 
reviewing the EM law and its application in Flint.  Sikkema remarked that Emergency 
Management is “the old theory of the benevolent dictator. Dictators work if you have a 
benevolent one, but what if you don’t? That’s a fundamental flaw in the current EM 
structure.”  Recommendations by that task force were never implemented during the 
period of active EMs.74 
 With Governor Snyder’s own task force even acknowledging the dangerous 
democratic suspension of Emergency Management, it is clear that Michigan’s residents 
saw Management as an occupation by the State, run by appointed dictators.  While 
alternatives to Management existed, the State effectively had the final stay, and could 
force reluctant localities into EM rule.  This occupation was functionally indefinite in 
practice, with numerous EMs lasting longer than an eighteen-month tenure due to the 
State’s habit of resetting the clock with new appointments.  Finally, residents, local 
officials, judges, state employees, and Republican State legislators all recognized these 
 
73 AlHajal, “Lawsuit: Emergency Manager Law Creates 'New Form of Government'.” 




facts.  Their concerns are evident in the numerous comparisons of Management to 
dictatorship, as well as the Iraqi Reconstruction and slavery. 
 
Occupation for Elite Benefit 
 On the surface, proponents of Emergency Management claimed that it benefited 
local residents.  An EM may have provided tough medicine, in the form of “government 
chemo,”75 but it was designed with citizens in mind.  However, while Emergency 
Management was ineffective at reducing local financial instability in the long term,76 EM 
rule was effective at enriching local and locally connected elites.  This impact is evident 
in the gains made by firms associated with Emergency Management.  The deals and 
contracts made on behalf of a local government, at the EM’s sole discretion, had a habit 
of personally enriching firms and promoting their interests.  Additionally, municipal 
bondholders were explicitly protected under Emergency Management. 
 An EM’s complete control over decision-making for a locality places them in the 
perfect position to distribute a government’s resources for a firm’s benefit.  The city of 
Benton Harbor is tied to the Whirlpool Corporation, manufacturer of household 
appliances.  Whirlpool has a large amount of power in local decision-making due to its 
large funds, network of non-profit organizations, and connections to public officials.77  
Traditionally, the policies of Benton Harbor’s city managers were usually captured 
through the influence of one of Whirlpool’s nonprofit organizations.  This generally 
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resulted in the city commission firing the manager.78  Benton Harbor’s first EM, Joseph 
Harris also followed Whirlpool’s preferences and was only fired “after Whirlpool and 
[local] government representatives met with state leaders [emphasis added].”79  This case 
is illustrative of the enduring force elites have under Emergency Management, 
highlighting that only the democratically elected government is disabled. 
 In Detroit, generally considered the most effective instance of Emergency 
Management, EM Kevyn Orr ensured that a firm personally connected to him benefited 
from the city’s bankruptcy.  Before he was an EM, Orr worked as an attorney for the law 
firm Jones Day.80  As Orr led Detroit into bankruptcy filing, Jones Day was hired to 
provide the leading attorneys for the case.  The firm was initially contracted for $3.35 
million, which was later expanded to $18 million.  In order to pay these and other legal 
fees, Orr had to divert money from the city’s pension and debt payments.81  These 
payments generated controversy not only for their size, but for the fact that attorneys 
billed the city for flights to and from their vacation homes, as well as expensive chauffeur 
services.82  Under Orr, the city of Detroit ended up paying $170.2 million for expenses 
related to the bankruptcy case.  Jones Day was the largest recipient of these payments, 
earning $57.9 million alone.83 
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 Flint’s water crisis, and the tragedy of mass poisoning and administrative neglect 
which followed, began with a switch from water provided by the Detroit Water and 
Sewerage Department (DWSD) to drawing water from the Flint river.  The river’s water 
was sent through the city’s old water treatment plant, which was not sufficiently 
upgraded to provide corrosion control to water from the Flint river.  Corrosive water 
flowing through the city’s old lead pipes wore away the protective coating, damaging 
infrastructure and poisoning city residents.84  EM Ed Kurtz ostensibly made the decision 
to switch water supplies for the benefit of Flint’s residents, who paid monthly water bills 
almost twice the state average.  However, these high rates appear to be the result of EM 
decisions, and not charges by DWSD before the switch.85  In order to solve this self-made 
problem, EM Kurtz proposed a solution in the form of a private water utility: the 
Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA).  The engineering firm Tucker, Young, Jackson, 
Tull (TYJT) was hired to evaluate Flint’s water service options, but their report in 
February 2013 was critical of participation in the KWA pipeline.  This advice was 
ignored.  A subsequent report from Rowe Professional Engineering, which had produced 
dubious estimates for Flint before, recommended the KWA option.86  Rowe had a stake 
in the construction of the KWA pipeline.87  During this time, DWSD had been issuing 
attractive offers to Flint.  In April of 2013, the DWSD offered a plan which would save 
the city 50% of what it paid at the time, as well as 20% more than the KWA option.  This 
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offer was rejected out of hand.88  In order to participate in the more expensive KWA 
service EM Kurtz, along with State officials and the KWA, distorted bond finance 
regulations to obtain an Administrative Consent Order allowing the already fiscally 
burdened city to acquire more debt.  During the 30-month period before the pipeline was 
built, the city was forced to rely on its aging water treatment plant.  While EM Kurtz had 
fastidiously pursued approval of the KWA project, he had failed to procure sufficient 
funds to upgrade the plant in time, resulting in horrific tragedy.89  This EM-led decision, 
which placed Flint into $81 million worth of unnecessary debt and poisoned its residents, 
provided the last funds KWA needed to construct its pipeline.  EM Kurtz was the 
decision-maker necessary to actualize a private water utility to compete with, and 
weaken, the public DWSD.90 
 Beyond the enrichment of individual well-connected firms, Emergency 
Management was explicitly designed to serve municipal bondholders and protect their 
interests.  Because municipal bonds are taken out by governments with tax-collecting 
powers, private equity generally receives stable earnings from providing these loans.  
Through the Emergency Management laws passed under Governor Snyder’s 
administration, EMs have extreme unilateral powers, including the ability to sell public 
assets and break union contracts.  However, EMs are unable to challenge contracts made 
with bondholders, despite the fact that these contracts are a primary source of municipal 
fiscal stress.  EMs are even restricted from renegotiating when there is public knowledge 
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that municipal bondholders acted fraudulently.  While Managers are restricted from 
renegotiating bond contracts, they are able to renegotiate interest rate swap contracts.  
However, they fail to do so.  In Detroit’s bankruptcy case, EM Orr did not challenge 
swap contracts with UBS and Bank of America, despite the fact that they acted 
fraudulently and the city could have recouped some of its money.  Instead, Orr settled 
with the companies, and paid them $465 million for contracts which Federal Judge 
Stephen Rhodes viewed liable to be thrown out if challenged.91  During the city of 
Detroit’s bankruptcy proceedings, Orr also had the city assume the $5.8 billion debt of 
the similarly named, but institutionally separate, regional public utility: the Detroit Water 
and Sewerage Department (DWSD).  There is no clear explanation for how assuming this 
debt aided the city of Detroit.  However, this move ensured that DWSD’s debtors would 
be paid, and that Detroit’s debt was higher on paper, strengthening the case for 
bankruptcy.92  Additionally, while the Flint Water Crisis destroyed residents' health, and 
tarnished the (fiscal) reputations of the State and local governments, creditors benefited 
from exceptionally high returns.93  EM Joyce Parker of Ecorse went an extra step to 
ensure creditors’ income, pushing for a law which allows small cities to contract out tax 
collection.  The tax collection agency would explicitly divert funds away from the local 
government to debtholders.  For localities, the only apparent advantage appears to be an 
improvement in their credit rating.94 
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 The implementation of Emergency Management has consistently led to benefits 
for elites connected to the city, the EM, and the State.  In Benton Harbor, EMs enabled 
the goals of the Whirlpool corporation and its affiliates, and served at their pleasure.  
During the Detroit bankruptcy case, the city’s law firms earned over $170 million, with 
the EM’s former employer as the highest recipient.  Through Flint EM Kurtz, State elites 
were able to actualize their goal of establishing a private water utility and weakening a 
traditional public service provider.  Within the structure of the law, and EM practice, the 
interests of private holders of municipal bonds also received special regard. 
 
The Limitations of Michigan’s Subnational Occupation 
 As suggested by the framework of subnational authoritarianism, SITO thrives 
when it is ignored by national political actors.  In particular, it requires sympathetic ears 
in the national judiciary and is threatened by the attention of the national ruling party.  
Both of these facets are evident in Michigan’s Emergency Management policy.  While 
Michigan residents filed multiple lawsuits challenging the unconstitutional and 
discriminatory aspects of EM-rule, judges consistently decided in the State’s favor.  The 
active Emergency Management of Michigan’s localities ended before national attention 
to the actions of EMs in the Flint water crisis began in January of 2016. Thus, the 
national government did not have a window of overlap for applying pressure to the State.  
Since then, prosecution of individuals involved in the water crisis has fallen to the State 
Attorney General, and a change in party control has highlighted the inadequacies of 




 Two major lawsuits were filed in federal court against PA 436 of 2012.  Both 
failed to overturn EM-rule.  The first, Phillips et al. v. Snyder, was filed in 2013, holding 
that PA 436 was unconstitutional illegitimate because: 
 
“(1)  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  
States  Constitution;  (2)  the  Guarantee  Clause  of  Article  IV,  §  4  of  the  
United  States  Constitution;  (3) the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause by burdening their right to vote and by discriminating  against  African  
Americans,  the  poor,  and  those  entities  that  had  emergency  managers  under  
the  previous  laws;  (4)  §  2  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  (VRA);  (5)  the  First  
Amendment  by  engaging  in  viewpoint  discrimination  and  infringing  on  
plaintiffs’  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  association,  and  right  to  petition  
their  government;  and  (6)  the  Thirteenth  Amendment.” (Phillips et al. v. 
Snyder 2016, page 5).  
 
In 2014, Judge George Steeh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, initially rejected all of these measures except for the claim that PA 436 unduly 
burdened the right to vote of African Americans.95  However, on appeal to the US Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the panel dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ grievances.  The court 
notably echoed Dillon’s rule by referencing “the Supreme Court’s venerable holding that 
 





states have ‘absolute discretion’ in allocating powers to their political subdivisions (and 
therefore to the officers running those subdivisions), which are ‘convenient agencies’ 
created by the states.”96  Drawing on extensive precedent, the Sixth Court’s opinion holds 
that there is no right to elected local government and that States have the full ability to 
eliminate the positions of elected officials.97  State governments are also fully capable of 
establishing a patchwork of local governments, with elected officials in some 
jurisdictions and appointed officials in others.98  Lastly, the Court of Appeals rejected 
claims of racial discrimination, holding that as long as a law was “facially neutral” actual 
disenfranchisement of ethnic communities is fully legal.99  The case was petitioned to the 
US Supreme Court in March 2017, but was rejected in October of that year.100  A second 
lawsuit was filed in late 2017 alleging that the law targeted black communities, but has 
also been unsuccessful.101 
 While the federal courts with jurisdiction over Michigan supported EM-rule, 
federal prosecutors were the department responsible for holding State officials 
accountable following the Flint water crisis.  Michigan’s Republican Attorney General 
(AG) Bill Schuette charged multiple state employees and officials over the water crisis 
between 2016 and 2017.102  However, pending charges were later dropped in 2019 after 
the new AG’s office, led by Democrat Dana Nessel, found that the Office of Special 
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Counsel (OSC) appointed by then-former AG Schuette had proceeded improperly in the 
investigations.  The OSC had provided the defendants’ private law firms with the 
extraordinary ability to determine what information was revealed to law enforcement.103  
On January 14th of 2021, the office of AG Nessel charged nine State officials, including 
former Governor Snyder, with criminal charges related to Flint’s water crisis.  In the 
announcement, this refiling of charges is explicitly stated as a follow-up to the problems 
found under AG Schuette.104  This saga of State prosecution highlights the limitations in 
accountability which regional officials can provide.  Without a change in party control, 
which did occur, or systematic pressure from the national government, which did not, 
State officials would have likely faced less severe penalties for their role in the Flint 
water crisis.  The absence of national-level pressure on Michigan’s Emergency 
Management policy is likely related to failures in holding individuals accountable, even 
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INDEFINITE TEMPORARY OCCUPATION AND THE FUTURE OF 
MICHIGAN’S CITIES 
 As shown above, the Emergency Management of local governments in the State 
of Michigan can be effectively described through the framework of SITO.  Officially, the 
last city was removed from management in 2015, a momentous occasion after 15 years 
with at least one local government under democratic suspension at a time.105  However, 
the lens of SITO forces observers to look beyond this apparent resumption of democracy 
and analyze the ways in which formerly-managed local governments suffer from 
continuing democratic suspension by the State.  After the departure of an EM, local 
governments suffer from financial instability, reduced institutional capacity and memory, 
as well as the entrenchment of undemocratic institutions.  These three factors ensure that 
communities’ democratically elected leaders face difficulties in governing effectively on 
behalf of their constituents, due to looming financial woes, decreased capabilities, and 
continuing explicit (though non-publicized) control by the State of Michigan. 
 
Financial Instability 
 Although Emergency Management is explicitly designed to improve local 
government’s fiscal health, it usually hampers a locality’s comprehensive financial 
stability.  While EMs appear to reduce short-term debt, this is usually due to an increase 
in long-term debt.  Additionally, EMs usually leave two-year budgets behind after their 
departures, hampering the ability of elected leaders to adapt to new issues in the near 
 




term.  These practices reduce the financial stability of local governments upon their 
return to self-rule. 
 Despite State-promoted narratives around Emergency Management rescuing local 
governments from financial ruin, EM performance on promoting long-term fiscal health 
has been lackluster.  This failure is immediately evident from the fact that Hamtramck, 
Flint, Highland Park, and Ecorse received multiple separate instances of Emergency 
Management.106  A deeper analysis of Hamtramck, Highland Park, and Ecorse illustrates 
how EMs (including the ever-present Louis Schimmel in Hamtramck from 2000 to 2007) 
utilized financial management to provide the appearance of recovery while undermining 
cities.  In each of these localities, EMs addressed budget deficits and short-term debt 
problems by issuing vast quantities of long-term debt.  Under EM-rule from 2003 to 
2010, Highland Park’s debt load increased from $904 to $4135 per capita.107  Ecorse’s 
debt increased from $478 per capita under EM Parker in 2009 to more than $1900 in 
2013, her last year.108  In Hamtramck, EM Schimmel also issued long-term debt to 
replace short-term obligations.  The overall debt per capita decreased from a high of $316 
in 2005, his penultimate full year of rule, to $52 in 2014.109  Also, none of the cities 
durably improved their pension funding ratios, a primary indicator of fiscal health, 
because of Management.110  These increases in debt, to the detriment of a locality’s 
financial stability, echo previously noted decisions taken regarding funding for the KWA 
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during Flint’s Emergency Management,111 and the DWSD’s debt during Detroit’s 
bankruptcy.112  Overall, EMs are liable to provide short-term solutions while increasing 
long-term debt without any real benefit to residents. 
 Before an EM departs, they are required to draw up a two-year budget to 
constrain elected officials in the near-term.  A local government is unable to ignore this 
budget without the consent of the State Treasurer, who helps initiate Emergency 
Management in the first place.113  As with every other aspect of EM policy, this 
restriction is ostensibly in place to help localities by preventing them from returning to 
their previous practices.  Since EMs seem to actually increase the debt burden of local 
governments, this budgetary constraint appears to harm financial health by reducing the 
speed at which debt may be paid off.  Even beyond addressing the debt accumulated by 
EMs, this budget reduces the ability of a government to quickly respond to changing 
economic circumstances.  While localities may appeal to the State Treasurer, this merely 
puts them at the mercy of the State government once again. 
 
Reduced Institutional Capacity and Memory 
 In EMs’ efforts to slash the size of local governments and their spending, EMs 
actively reduce the capabilities of localities.  After Emergency Management, cities are 
left with fewer physical property assets and less office space.  EMs also reduce the size 
and capacity of local first responders.  Most crucially, EMs have a habit of reducing the 
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ability of local institutions to ensure accountability to their constituents by weakening 
oversight organizations and harming the institutional memory of local governments.  All 
of these decisions hamper the ability of future elected governments to govern, provide 
services to residents, and remain accountable to local citizens. 
 The expansion of EM authority under Governor Snyder enabled EMs to 
unilaterally sell off city property.  While this ostensibly enabled EMs to raise funds for 
local governments, they repeatedly made sales which under-valued the properties and 
ignored the non-commercial value of assets.114  In Pontiac, the EM auctioned off the 
Pontiac Silverdome to an investor for $580,000.  This sale vastly undercut the city, as the 
Silverdome had received an $18 million bid the previous year and had been assessed for a 
market value of $7 million.  EM Orr of Detroit repeatedly threatened to sell items from 
the Detroit Institute of Art and also proposed selling city land for the construction of a 
bridge between the US and Canada.  Both proposals were only withdrawn after sustained 
and organized public outcry.115  In Benton Harbor, EM Harris sold parkland and undercut 
future park funding in order to promote the Whirlpool Corporation's plans for the 
development of a substantial golf course.116  Flint’s EM Darnell Earley sold a portion of 
the city’s water pipeline to Genesee County over the city council’s objections.  Following 
the end of Emergency Management in Flint and the city’s return to DWSD, the city had 
to lease back the pipe.117  One of Flint’s EMs even attempted to get rid of the city’s 
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collection of Christmas decorations.118  In each instance, EM-led sales of city property 
undercut the finances of the local government.  Furthermore, they reduced the localities’ 
abilities to maintain non-economic services: provide a local sports venue, maintain 
reputable art institutions, expand green and recreational space for residents, and provide 
clean water at reasonable rates.  All of these actions, once undertaken, are difficult or 
impossible for future officials to reverse.119 
 Another common tactic of EMs was to reduce the size of local first responders, 
particularly firefighters and police officers.  In Pontiac, EM Schimmel shut down the 
city’s police department and outsourced the jobs to the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office.  
He did the same with the city’s fire department, outsourcing it to the neighboring 
township of Waterford.  Ecorse’s EM Parker fired police officers and firefighters, merged 
both departments into one, and trained the remaining employees to perform both jobs.120  
On behalf of Benton Harbor, EM Harris also combined the fire and police departments 
while generally firing “essential personnel.”121  In Flint, EM Brown unilaterally instituted 
a contract which reduced police pay, increased the length of their shifts, and enabled the 
use of volunteers or part-time officers to replace full-time police officers.122  EM Orr of 
Detroit rendered the city’s Detroit Board of Police Commissioners impotent, preventing 
the civilian oversight committee from holding the police department accountable.123  All 
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of these changes reduced the capacity of local first responders as well as their ability to 
provide engaged, accountable services to residents.  The necessity of professional, local, 
and responsive emergency services is particularly important due to the large minority 
populations in these localities and historically fraught relationships between residents and 
first responders.  EMs repeatedly and explicitly worked against these aims, prizing fiscal 
returns (or police impunity in Detroit) over effective governance. 
 Under Emergency Management, cities also tend to lose general institutions for 
accountability in governance.  As an EFM in Hamtramck in 2001, EM Schimmel sought 
to sell off the City Hall and ‘lay off’ one of the two local judges.”124  This remarkable 
goal is highlighted by the fact that Schimmel had these goals under the “weaker” 
Emergency Financial Management system.  Before Management, the city of Flint had an 
Office of the Ombudsman responsible for monitoring mismanagement and corruption in 
governance.  EM Ambrose eliminated this Office and explicitly prevented Flint from re-
instituting it after his departure.125  In Benton Harbor, EM Harris took the illegal move of 
placing the city’s radio station, and its equipment, up for sale on eBay.  This action was 
both illegal and a likely reaction to a city commissioner’s criticism of EM-rule during 
radio broadcasts.  He also sought to reduce financial oversight of local government.  EM 
Harris’s sale of the City Hall administrative building and firing of vast numbers of city 
employees harmed institutional capability and memory, further impairing oversight.126  
During the lengthy periods of EM-rule in Pontiac, the amount of city employees was also 
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reduced from 900 in the early 2000s to 74 in 2013.127  As in Benton Harbor, this action 
likely also eviscerated the city’s know-how and ability to meet its resident’s needs.  
Overall, these EM decisions highlight a regular effort to kneecap local governments and 
their ability to serve constituents. 
 
Entrenchment of Undemocratic Institutions 
 The most insidious aspect of Emergency Management is the continuing control of 
State-appointed technocrats after the public departure of an EM.  These appointed 
positions either temporarily (indefinitely) defer, or permanently prevent, a resumption of 
democracy in local government comparable to levels citizens enjoyed before 
Management. 
 In terms of indefinite temporary institutions reducing democratic control, the 
administration of Governor Rick Snyder ensured that departing EMs established a 
Receivership Transition Advisory Board (RTAB) in every city that left Emergency 
Management under his tenure.  Ecorse, Pontiac, Benton Harbor, Allen Park, Hamtramck, 
Flint, and Lincoln Park all received RTABs from April 2013 through December 2015.128  
In some cases, former EMs also serve on these boards.129  Members were also associated 
with local elites and firms who had benefited from Emergency Management, like the 
Whirlpool Corporation in Benton Harbor.130  Officially, an RTAB is provided for under 
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Public Act 436 of 2012 and charged with ensuring a local government’s “fiscal and 
organizational stability” after the departure of an EM.131  Explicitly, Section 21(2) of PA 
436 provides for an RTAB to mandate a budget, which the local government cannot 
amend without State Treasurer approval.  However, Section 23(5)(h) instructs the RTAB 
to conduct “any other duties assigned by the governor at the time the [RTAB] is 
appointed.”  This vagueness can provide RTABs with the grounds to take exceptional 
actions to restrict the abilities of democratically elected officials, or at least attempt to do 
so, even after an EM leaves.   
For instance, the Mayor of Flint, Karen Weaver, took procedural steps in early 
2016 necessary to maintain the option of suing the State government for the city’s water 
crisis.  In response the RTAB, which consists primarily of the governor’s appointees, 
voted in March of 2016 that all litigation pursued by the city must be approved by the 
board.  In October of that year, Michigan’s Democratic members of the US Congress 
asked the Department of Justice to evaluate the decision-making of Flint’s RTAB.  The 
following day, the board amended its previous decision so that only the settlement of any 
litigation requires the RTAB’s approval.132  While Flint’s RTAB voted to end its control 
on Jan. 11, 2018,133 some measure of State control remained until April of that year.134  
As Flint exited Emergency Management in April 2015, it is interesting to note that a 
measure of democratic suspension remained for three full years after the public end of 
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EM rule.  While the RTABs for every city had recommended the termination of 
receivership status by March 2nd of 2018 (with Hamtramck being the last),135 the tenure 
of these boards was seen by observers as indefinite upon their appointment.136  The city 
of Ecorse was overseen by an RTAB for the longest period.  From its first meeting on 
June 11th, 2013 until its exit letter to the mayor on December 18th, 2017 the board 
constricted democratic leaders for a total of four years and six months.137 
The city of Detroit received a special form of RTAB.  Instead of the normal 
board, Detroit received the Detroit Financial Review Commission (FRC).  As part of the 
city’s bankruptcy deal in 2014, the FRC was instituted for a 13-year term.  The 
Commission was tasked with approving Detroit’s budgets, any collective bargaining, and 
large contracts.138  Eleven members serve on the FRC, five appointed by the State, the 
State Treasurer and Budget Director, Detroit’s Mayor and City Council President, along 
with the Superintendent and School Board Chairperson for the Detroit Public Schools 
Community District.139  In 2018, the FRC decided to lift its direct control over Detroit’s 
budget, a move democratic actualization greeted with joy in the city government.  
However, the FRC will remain in place until 2017, meeting twice a year and capable of 
resuming direct oversight at any time the city runs a budget deficit.140 
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Beyond these temporary, but indefinite, institutions of State financial oversight, 
EMs also sought to permanently alter the very structure of local governments, reducing 
the number and strength of elected officials.  Before Emergency Management, most local 
governments had strong elected city commissions or councils along with mayoral seats.  
This form of governance is contrasted with that of a “city manager,” an appointed official 
who rules, usually in conjunction with an elected council.  In Benton Harbor, the first 
EM, Harris, pushed multiple city ballot items which would have diminished the size and 
power of the elected city commission in favor of strengthening the city manager.  The 
city’s second EM, Saunders, actualized this scheme, bolstering the power of Benton 
Harbor’s city manager.  While leaving, EMs also created or amplified appointed city 
manager, or city administrator, positions in Allen Park, Hamtramck, Pontiac, and Flint.141  
In Ecorse, EM Parker accepted emergency loans from the State on behalf of the city.  
These loans required that Ecorse implement a city administrator position, one which EM 
Parker delineated the qualifications for.142  While Allen Park,143 Flint, and Pontiac144 
have removed their city managers, the other localities have not been so lucky.  
Hamtramck has had at least four city managers since 2012, often with fractious relations 
with the elected city council.145  Despite this turnover, the position appears to be durable 
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because Hamtramck has a $3 million loan which requires a city manager.146  Ecorse’s 
city administrator is protected by a similar loan deal, but the city would also require the 
approval of the state treasurer before firing the appointee.147 
Even after the public departure of an EM, management continues through the 
financial oversight of RTABs and Detroit’s FRC as well as more permanent changes to a 
local government’s structure.  These institutional alterations ensure that elected leaders, 
and thus their constituents, receive a weaker and more constrained democracy after 
Emergency Management ends.  Appointed institutions generally favor local white elites 
over actual residents, who are often black.  The reduction of power is justified by 
racialized narratives of corruption and “mismanagement.”148  The utility and skills of 
appointed leaders are rationalized through undemocratic narratives of “technocracy” 
which prize professionalized skills and denigrate the sometimes chaotic processes of 
democratic policy making.149  When reviewing systemic-issues cities under Emergency 
Management, the consistency with which different EMs in different localities employ 
similar tactics highlights the fact that continuing democratic suspension is a feature of 
Management, not a bug. 
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 Over the 3 decades since Louis Schimmel was appointed receiver of Ecorse by a 
State judge in 1986, Michigan has developed a robust institution for undermining local 
democratic governance.  The most recent law, PA 436 of 2012, remains on the books 
with little prospect of revision or removal.  During this time, Louis Schimmel has served 
as the backbone and architect of Emergency Management legislation, as the first receiver 
and as a think tank-writer, along with EM implementation, publicly ruling three cities for 
13 years.  Throughout Emergency Management, a bifurcation has appeared between 
richer, majority-white single-issue cities and their counterparts facing systemic-issues.  
This work primarily focuses on those systemic-issues cities because of the breadth and 
depth of EM disruption within them. 
 Previous scholars have attempted to assess Emergency Management through the 
frameworks of public administration and discriminatory policy.  The public 
administration literature accurately addresses the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of EMs, 
but fails to reach beyond common quantitative metrics.  Through the lens of 
discriminatory policy, researchers have done significant work highlighting the racialized 
aspects of EM-rule, as well as the ways in which Emergency Management is a 
continuation of historic trends of systemic discrimination and racism.  By drawing on a 
fusion of international literature on indefinite temporary occupation, along with Robert 
Mickey’s exploration of subnational authoritarianism in Paths out of Dixie, subnational 
indefinite temporary occupation (SITO) synthesizes and complements the literature.  




an extension of analysis backwards in history and a recognition of the ways in which an 
EM can harm a locality beyond accruing debt.  Discriminatory policy literature is also 
advanced through SITO by a recognition of Emergency Management’s uniqueness.  In no 
other circumstance has one individual been vested with the power to wreak such havoc 
on local government.  Both facets of previous research are enhanced by a recognition that 
EM driven disruption is not merely a reflection of contemporary or historic trends, but 
also continues to reverberate after their departure. 
 Regardless of the founder’s original views on local governance, the supremacy of 
Dillon’s Rule over Cooley’s Doctrine has juridically enshrined the subordination and 
frailty of American local democracy.  This institutional narrative, couple with structural 
urban disinvestment and systemic racism, provided the perfect environment for 
Michigan’s Emergency Management policy.  Once implemented, “managed” citizens and 
myriad State elites recognized EM-rule as a form of indefinite occupation and democratic 
suspension at the hands of a local “dictator.”  Occupation by the State government 
allowed elites to leverage the resources of localities for profit and the realization of their 
policy preferences.  Emergency Management allowed elites to capture these 
opportunities, silence traditional democratically-elected opposition, and was contingent 
on their assent.  This uncertain stasis thrived under Republican regime continuity and the 
consent or distraction of national government institutions. 
 Looking forward, Michigan’s cities which underwent Emergency Management 
were returned to democratic rule far worse for wear.  Localities were generally more 




Governments are also far less capable of governing, retaining less institutional memory 
and suffering from eviscerated capacity for action.  The foundational structures and 
autonomy of these cities are also weakened after EM departure.  Financial independence 
is restricted for years after an EM’s headline departure fades.  More power amongst 
governing officials is invested in appointed positions, and the local government as a 
whole is less accountable. 
 As the time since the last active EM lengthens, the framework of SITO helps 
illuminate why studying this phenomenon in Michigan matters.  Principally, the juridical 
factors enabling the State occupation of local governments are still strong and look to 
remain so for the foreseeable future.  The US’s State governments continue to wield 
exceptional autonomy, the Dillon’s Rule absence of a right to local self-governance is 
enshrined in legal thought, and PA 436 of 2012 remains in place.  It is easy to imagine a 
world in which another Republican Governor wins Michigan’s 2022 gubernatorial 
election and seeks to “manage” localities which have suffered from economic downturns 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Furthermore, the ascension of Betsy DeVos to 
Education Secretary under President Trump shows the impact that Michigan’s proponents 
of neoliberal policy can have on the national stage.  Supporters of Emergency 
Management saw their transformations of local governments as a fundamental 
transformation into a new, and better, form of government.150  Even beyond State-led 
 




initiatives, private philanthropies have also sought to control local policy in the long-
term.151 
 At the beginning of Paths out of Dixie, Mickey states that “‘backsliding’ into 
authoritarian rule is unlikely,” when compared to authoritarianism at the national level.152  
However, the recent resurgence of voter restrictions and the solidification of one-party 
Republican rule in the American South highlights the likelihood of democratic 
backsliding.  What Mickey overlooks is the fact that the underlying insidious factors of 
anti-democratic may be more tenacious and more easily overlooked than has been 
previously assumed.  In that case, the resilience of the systemic racism and juridical 
factors enabling SITO hints at the ease with which widespread Emergency Management 
may be reinstated within Michigan, or be adopted by other State governments. 
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